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Abstract
This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven
by the inherent technical features of di¤erent production factors and the political conicts among factor
owners on how to divide the outputs. The main production factor in economy evolves from land to
physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists,
and workers) to gain political power in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from
monarchy to oligarchy and nally to democracy with full su¤rage. When it is too costly for any group
of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked;
otherwise, the political conicts may lead to economic stagnation.
JEL: O10, O40, P16, N10.
Key Words: Economic Development, Political Development, Democratization, Class Structure, Land,
Physical Capital, Human Capital, Monarchy, Oligarchy, Democracy, Su¤rage Extension.
1 Introduction
The main story line of human history may be driven by the dynamic interactions between cooperative eco-
nomic activities leading to greater aggregate wealth and political conicts over its distribution. The current
paper attempts to formalize this idea in a simple model of long run economic and political development
illustrated in Figure 1. As the main factor of production shifts from land to physical capital and then to
human capital, the relative economic and hence coercive power of landlords, capitalists, and workers shifts
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Figure 1: The Time Line of Economic and Political Development
accordingly, inducing the transition of political system from monarchy to oligarchy (of landowners and capi-
talists) and nally to democracy with full su¤rage. Every new political regime, by extending political power
to the owners of the new form of capital and thus increasing their future economic gains from investment,
speeds up economic progress. Such a smooth reinforcing coevolution path between economic and politi-
cal development happens only when political compromise is reached at both transition periods Tk and Th;
otherwise the political conicts over output distribution may lead to repression and economic stagnation.
The main results of the paper are consistent with historical evidence especially in Western Europe where
the full time line in the model has been realized. From the beginning of settled agriculture, the predominance
of land in production lasted thousands of years (Cipolla 1976). Gradually, commercial and industrial sectors
replaced agriculture to become dominant economic activities, leading to the Industrial Revolution in the
last half of the eighteenth century (North 1981). By the early twentieth century, the modern concept of
the wealth of nations emerged: It was that capital embodied in the people human capital mattered.
(Goldin 2001)
The dynamic compatibility between the evolving composition of production factors in economy and
the transition of political regimes is also observed in history. After the fall of the Roman Empire in the
fth century up to the year 1000, Europe was stagnating in income and population. The introduction of
feudalism in the 9th century enabled Europe to gradually emerge from anarchy and develop a political-
economic structure that produced su¢ cient order and stability and led to a concomitant expansion of both
population and economic activity (North 1981). Feudal landlords directed all their attention and e¤orts
to the maintenance and expansion of their inherited lands, which were the most important form of wealth
and power. The rising territorial rulers, the kings and emperors of the tenth to the thirteenth century,
were in essence nothing more than the winners in the free-for-all for control over the sparse surpluses of a
still relatively unproductive agricultural economy. (Blockmans 1998, p. 72) Through numerous conicts,
alliances, and combinations among the many political units of western Europe gradually emerged strong
2
national monarchies. By 1500 much of the political ground-plan of modern Europe was already there, where
England and France were recognizable in their modern form.
As more surpluses from agriculture became available, towns started to grow in the tenth century in paral-
lel to the formation and consolidation of the kingdoms. The princes beneted in this process by getting extra
revenues from the cities. As the economic development strengthened the business and profession classes, the
citizenry struggled for autonomy and independency. The survival of e¤ectively functioning representative
bodies, however, depended on both external pressures and domestic structures. The development of parlia-
mentary democracy was made easier in England by its relatively weak repressive apparatus compared with
continental monarchies and the joint force of the landowners and bourgeoisie (the upper stratum of town
dwellers) against the monarchy (Moore 1966, p. 32). After the Glorious Revolution in 1688 Parliament
became more sympathetic and accessible to the aspirations of merchants, masters and manufacturers, farm-
ers and landowners (OBrien 1994). The Industrial Revolution started rst in England around the mid
18th century, and many years later spread to other countries. The industrialization process brought forth
fundamental economic and political transformations across Europe especially after the French Revolution.
Though di¤erent in timing and format across countries, the propertied class in western Europe had acquired
substantial political powers during the 19th century and transformed the traditional absolute monarchies to
an essentially oligarchical rule of landowners and capitalists.
The Industrial Revolution created a large working class concentrated in urban neighborhoods and work-
places free of segmental feudal control, greatly enhancing the coordination e¢ ciency among workers. In its
second phase the demand for skilled workers was driven up, which induced massive education reforms in
many European countries during the latter half of the 19th century (Galor and Moav 2006). The rising
human capital of workers and their increasing ability to coordinate in collective actions eventually led to
franchise expansion in several European countries (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). At the end of the First
World War in the early 20th century, the agrarian societies of peasants and craftsman in many European
countries had already been turned into industrialized societies of machine-tenders and bookkeepers, and
correspondingly, the oligarchical rule was replaced eventually by democratic institutions with full su¤rage
across Western Europe.
In the model, the sequence of the economic development path is mainly determined by the distinct
technical features of production factors: Land is endowed by nature and di¢ cult to be created or destroyed;
physical capital, in contrast, has to be produced endogenously with material investment; the raw labor
is endowed by nature, but human capital beyond this basic level has to be acquired through endogenous
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investment. The exogenous endowment of land and raw labor makes it benecial to invest in physical capital
rst when savings become available, while the capital-skill complementarity would trigger human capital
investment when the stock of physical capital is large enough (Galor and Moav 2006).
The establishment and transition of political regimes are driven by two assumptions. The rst one is
essentially might-is-right in that the agent or group with dominant coercive power becomes the ruler, where
a groups coercive power depends on its economic strength and coordination e¢ ciency. Once in power, the
incumbent ruler may, depending on the repression cost, preserve its political dominance by stagnating the
economic progress to curb the growing economic/coercive power of the challenging group. This leads to
the second assumption, the incumbents advantage, since the possibility to repress increases the incumbents
bargaining power above its coercive ability based upon economic strength. When the repression cost is
neither too low nor too high, a political compromise that is mutually benecial for both the incumbent
ruler and the challenging group would be reached in equilibrium so that the political transition is achieved
smoothly and the economic development is facilitated as illustrated in Figure 1. Otherwise, repression or
revolution may occur and the economic development may be blocked or delayed.1
It is important to point out that in the model the economic growth is a necessary but not su¢ cient con-
dition toward political development for at least three reasons. First, the more fundamental force underlying
democratization is not the income level per se, but the changing factor composition (where the predominant
factor shifts from land to physical capital and nally to human capital), since the latter determines the
changing economic and coercive power of di¤erent factor owners. That is, the production factor composition
is the common factor that a¤ects both the nature of the political regime and the potential for economic
growth. The reason is as follows. Landowners are easily separated by force from their land without endan-
gering the supply of land or badly hurting the overall productivity. This promotes constant ghting over
land ownership and often diverts valuable resources from investing constructively in capital and skills, which
seems to be the ultimate cause for the natural resource curse (Ross 1999, Boix and Stokes 2003, Lagerlof
and Tangeras 2007). It also explains the emergence of monarchy and other authoritarian governments, since
it is possible for them to capture a large amount of land and other natural resource using coercive forces;
1Note that the coercive ability is similar to the de facto power used by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a), while the incumbent
rulers repression capacity has some similarity to the de jure power. From this perspective, an innovation of the current paper
lies in the dynamic links between the de facto and de jure power: The group with dominant de facto power becomes the rst
ruler and hence acquires de jure power (the might-is-right assumption); the incumbent ruler can use de jure power to repress
the ruled group to curtail its de facto power (the incumbents advantage). The political development path is mainly driven
by the dynamic consistency between the two types of power: As the economy grows, the relative de facto power of di¤erent
groups keeps changing, which eventually leads to corresponding change in the allocation of de jure power, though in some
circumstances the incumbent can delay such a process at the cost of having a stagnant economy and unstable political system.
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the other side of the coin is that the absolute monarchy, by curbing the destructive rent-seeking behaviors
necessarily prevalent in a land-dominant economy, actually facilitates economic development in comparison
to anarchy and hence remains as a stable political regime for a long time in history. In sharp contrast to land,
conscating the shops or factories of capitalists is feasible only for a short time, since their ultimate source,
the capitalists entrepreneurial skills, is di¢ cult to be captured by force. This implies that, with capital
accumulation, the source of economic growth is now dispersed among individual capitalists and cannot be
easily controlled or centralized by coercion as in the case of land or other natural resources. Moreover, the
stock of physical capital keeps increasing as the economy grows, which would eventually replace the relatively
xed land as the predominant source of wealth and enable its owners to gain political rights to protect their
capital returns; the alternative of repressing the growing power of capital owners is necessarily associated
with a potentially high cost of stagnating the economy, which is not only economically unappealing but
could also be politically dangerous for the monarch since an ine¢ cient economy often induces domestic up-
heavals and foreign invasions. So the endogenous supply of physical capital is the fundamental driving force
underlying the unavoidable democratization process from monarchy to oligarchy; since the same logic also
applies to human capital beyond the raw labor, the oligarchy of landowners and capitalists would nally
give way to full democracy where workers as the owners of human capital also gain political rights and all
factor owners earn competitive returns. This accounts for why in both history and current times, most
democracies have industrialized economies where human capital is the dominant production factor, while in
countries with natural resources as the main factor in production, authoritarian political regimes are more
likely to happen.2
The second reason is that a political transition often makes its breakthrough in a short period, while its
preparation usually takes a long time through economic development. This is consistent with the ndings of
Acemoglu et al. (2006) who cast doubt on the short-term causal e¤ect of income on democracy after World
War II, but nd evidence that such a relationship may exist in a much longer horizon. Similarly, Boix and
Stokes (2003) argue that it is the prewar period from the late nineteenth century through the end of World
War II in which the impact of income on democracy is most powerful. The third reason is that the level
of repression costs during the crucial transitional periods, which may be a¤ected by geopolitical, religious,
ideological and other ultra-economic elements, is also critical in determining the ultimate political outcome.
For example, a country with faster economic growth but faced with much lower repression costs may end up
2See Lipset (1959), Huber et al. (1993), Burkart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Londregan and Poole (1996), Przeworski and
Limongi (1997), Ross (1999), Boix (2003), and Epstein et al. (2006) among others in the large modernization literature.
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in repression, while another country with slower growth but higher repression costs may make the political
transition rst.
The paper proceeds as follows. The related literature is discussed in the next section. The basic elements
of the political economy model are introduced in Section 3, and the analysis of the model is in Section 4.
Further discussions of related historical evidence are collected in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are
o¤ered in the nal section. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related Literature
The paper belongs to a broad literature connecting growth, development and institutions in a long-term
perspective.3 Its primary contribution is using a unied political economy framework to analyze the democ-
ratization process from monarchy to oligarchy and nally to democracy with full su¤rage in the context of
dynamic economic development. This framework seems very useful in uniting scattered results and reconcil-
ing conicting views in a systematic way. To certain extent, the model suggests that the history of human
society is in essence an integrated democratization process where each country, though taking their unique
routes, moves in the same broad historical trend with its tone set by the changing predominance of land,
physical capital, and human capital in economy.
The democratization process due to its immense importance and complexity has been a major subject
in comparative history. In a landmark study Moore (1966, p. 429) found that getting rid of agriculture
as a major social activity is one prerequisite for successful democracyand robust capitalist development is
crucial in achieving this. Moores conclusion on the role of the bourgeoisie as the primary agent of democracy,
though widely shared by the orthodox Marxist and liberal social science view, is challenged by Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens (1992, p. 270) who instead conclude that a key actor in the development of full
democracy almost everywhere is not capitalists but the organized working class, and the widely believed
association of capitalist development with democracy is mainly because it strengthens the working class.
These seemingly conicting conclusions are, however, consistent with and neatly reconciled by the main
results of the current paper: The focus of Moore is on the rst political transition from monarchy to oligarchy
(or parliamentary democracy in more conventional terms), while that of Rueschemeyer et al. is mostly on
the second political transition from oligarchy to full democracy. Distinguishing these two transitional stages
helps to clarify the crucial role of capitalists in breaking the absolute power of monarchy and initiating the
parliamentary democracy at an earlier historical occasion, and that of the working class strengthened during
3See Bertocchi (2006b) for a survey of related literature.
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the industrialization process in pushing for further franchise expansion at a later time. To be sure, these
two democratization stages inherently share some common features, which are also obvious in the model;
distinguishing them analytically, however, seems to bring more insights than ignoring their critical di¤erences
in the historical timing and economic bases (of physical capital and human capital respectively).
The formal analysis of democratization started only recently in economics. Relatively few studies fo-
cus on the rst political transition from monarchy to oligarchy: Olson (1993) argues that, compared with
anarchy, a tax-collecting monarch brings substantial benets to the people and permits a considerable de-
velopment of civilization.North and Weingast (1989) discuss the emergence of parliamentary democracy in
the 17th century England and the corresponding improvement of property rights security after the Glorious
Revolution. DeLong and Shleifer (1993) provide evidence showing that absolutist princes, in comparison to
representative governments, retarded the economic growth especially in cities. Bertocchi (2006a) models the
evolution of the land inheritance system from primogeniture to partition when landed estates are replaced
by capital as the primary source of wealth. These results t nicely into the framework of the current paper,
where monarchy arises in equilibrium from the anarchy among landowners and facilitates economic devel-
opment and capital accumulation, and if it is replaced later by oligarchy due to the growing strength of
capitalists and other landlords, the commercial and industrial interests would be promoted, and when it is
not, economic stagnation is the likely result.
There are quite a number of studies on how the voting franchise is further expanded from oligarchy to full
su¤rage. In the seminal study of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), franchise expansion is used by the ruling
elites to mitigate the revolutionary threat from workers; following the same theme of conict resolution,
Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) nd that the elites may want to co-opt a subset of the challenging group. The
alternative rationale for su¤rage extension, in contrast, suggests that the elites may do it voluntarily in their
own best interests (Lizzeri and Persico 2004, Jack and Laguno¤ 2006, Lee 2003). Both views nd support
in historical evidence either in di¤erent countries or at di¤erent times, which prompts further research to
characterize conditions that give rise to distinct transition paths (Justman and Gradstein 1999, Boix 2003,
Engerman and Sokolo¤ 2005, Llavador and Oxoby 2005, Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde 2006, Gradstein
2007). The current paper adds to this stream of literature by endogenizing the increasing importance of
human capital over the industrialization process, and specifying the exact timing and conditions for su¤rage
extension, repression, and revolution. More importantly, it accounts for the gradual su¤rage extension from
the absolute monarchy to oligarchy by landlords and capitalists, and nally to full democracy using the same
analytical framework where the same fundamental forces are in play. It shows that this general historical
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trend of political power being shared among more people over time is driven ultimately by the dynamic
economic development where the predominant source of wealth evolves from land to physical capital and
later to human capital.
The long-term growth literature typically abstracts from the political conict that is the focus of the
democratization literature. The economic development path in the current paper builds on the important
insights of Galor and Moav (2006), who demonstrate that the complementarity between physical and human
capital would eventually eliminate the class distinction between capitalists and workers. Galor and Weil
(2000) show that human capital accumulation and the associated demographic changes are the driving forces
in the transition from Malthus stagnation to modern growth, while Hansen and Prescott (2002) emphasize
the role of exogenous technological progress in moving the economy from agricultural to industrial production
methods. These and other studies on the unied growth theory are surveyed by Galor (2005). The current
paper contributes to this literature by highlighting the natural change of production factor composition
during the economic growth process and the role of political transitions in shaping the distinct economic
development paths across countries.
Another strand of literature studies the e¤ects of institutions on long-run growth. North (1981) proposes a
dynamic framework of political economy and substantiates it by rewriting the Western history in its light. He
recognizes not only the inuence of technology advancement on political institutions especially the property
rights, but also the e¤ects of political institutions on future technological and economic development. In
some sense, the current paper is an attempt to formalize this dynamic framework in a simple model. It
thus may shed light on the current debates on whether technology or institutions are more important for
long-run growth. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that institutions are the fundamental
cause of long-run growth,4 while Glaeser et al. (2004) demonstrate that human capital is more fundamental
than institutions. Actually both claims can be true in the chain of dynamic interactions between economic
fundamentals and political institutions shown in the current paper, depending on which specic segment one
chooses to investigate. For example, among countries with similar institutional backgrounds (e.g. colonies
of the same mother country), the initial gap in economic fundamentals may become the ultimate cause of
their later divergence since institutions are often endogenously adopted (Engerman and Sokolo¤ 1997, Rajan
and Zingales 2006). Consistent with results in the current paper, Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2006) nd
that the inequality of land ownership, though benecial in earlier development, can be a major hurdle in the
4 In a related work along this line, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) nd that conventional measures of geography
have a strong indirect e¤ect on incomes by inuencing the quality of institutions.
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emergence of human capital promoting institutions and hence negatively a¤ect future economic performance.
Similarly, Gradstein (2007) shows that high income inequality may induce poor protection of property rights
and hence stagnate the economy. On the other hand, between countries with similar initial human capital
(e.g. North and South Korea), di¤erent institutions caused by exogenous factors may account for their
later economic development gaps. In this paper, the same economy with di¤erent repression costs during
the political transition periods may generate distinct political outcomes, which will a¤ect the economic
development path afterwards. This is similar in spirit to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b), who nd that
the political security of the incumbent elites may determine whether they would block technological and
institutional innovations that potentially undermine their incumbency advantages.
To the extent that the cooperative and conicting sides of human interactions are treated simultaneously,
the paper is connected with Hirshleifer (1994), Grossman and Kim (1995), and Grossman (2002) among
others. The papers analysis of the political conicts among factor owners is similar to the Marxist approach
of class struggles (Marx and Engels 1848), which has become a very useful analytical tool in social sciences.
In the paper, however, the class conicts over income distribution are embedded in the cooperative context
of economic activities, and eventually resolved under democracy where political rents disappear and each
factor earns its competitive market returns. This result echoes Polanys (1944) view that a competitive
market economy was brought forth together with political democracy for the rst time in human history by
the industrialization process. He observes that both harmony and conicts are inherent in economy, and
they often lead to each other in a dynamic world. On this point the current paper further suggests that the
cooperative side dominates history progress in the long run, though the conicting side may change historic
paths for some time and often into the stagnant direction.
3 The Political Economy Model
3.1 The Economy
Technology. In every period the economy produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for
consumption and investment. The production function at time t is
Yt = At(L+Kt)
1 Ht :
The knowledge stock At grows at an exogenous speed g > 0 so that At+1 = At(1 + g), which is the ultimate
growth engine. The quantity of land L is xed overtime, while the stock of physical capital Kt and human
capital Ht depreciates fully after one period. Physical capital Kt+1 is produced by capitalists who combine
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material resources mkt and knowledge At+1 according to
Kt+1 = K(m
k
t ; At+1); (1)
which strictly increases in both arguments. We assume K(0; ) = 0 where a positive amount of material
mkt > 0 is needed to produce any physical capital. The aggregate human capital at time t is Ht  Ntht
where Nt is the number of workers and ht the amount of human capital per worker. The human capital
production function is
ht+1 = h(m
h
t ; At+1); (2)
which strictly increases in both arguments, where mht denotes the material resources spent in public educa-
tion.5 We assume h(0; ) = 1 so that a worker is endowed with a basic unit of human capital, namely the
raw labor, even without any education expenditure; to acquire human capital above the basic level, however,
positive amount of material is needed. A related assumption is h1(0; ) =  < +1 meaning that the human
capital production function has a nite slope at zero investment.
The sequence of the economic development path in Figure 1 is mainly determined by the distinct technical
features of these three factors of production, where land and raw labors are endowed by nature, while physical
capital and human capital have to be produced endogenously. The exact timing of the economic development
stages, however, is also a¤ected by institutional elements such as the political structure discussed below.
Preferences and Demographic Structure. There are overlapping generations in the economy with
a xed population size.6 Each individual lives for two periods, who may accumulate human capital in
childhood and participate in production at adulthood. Individuals are identical in preferences, which are
represented by a log-linear utility function7
uti = (1  ) log cti +  log(Z + bti);
where cti is the adulthood consumption of individual i in generation t, bti is his bequest for o¤spring,
 2 (0; 1) indicates the relative weight of bequest in utility, and Z > 0 represents some threshold level of
income. The budget constraint is cti + bti  Iti, where Iti is individual is income at adulthood. As a result
of utility maximization, his optimal bequest is bti = maxf(Iti   Z); 0g; that is, only when an individuals
5Though mass education by private nancing is possible in principal (Bertocchi and Spagat 2004), it was not the typical
case in history due to the subsistence level of wages and the imperfection of credit markets; see Galor and Moav (2006) for
more evidence.
6 In an earlier version of the paper the population size was set to follow the broad demographic trends in history as in Hansen
and Prescott (2002); the main results were the same.
7This type of utility function is used by Galor and Moav (2006) and Fishman and Simhon (2002) among others; as long as
the society saves, the exact specications of utility function are not essential for the qualitative results.
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income is higher than a certain level indicated by Z, would there be any resources left as bequest. The total
bequest in society is
Bt =
X
i
bti =
X
i
maxf(Iti   Z); 0g; (3)
which can be invested in physical or human capital for the next generation where mkt +m
h
t  Bt.
There are NL landowners and NK capitalists who are few in number. The initial endowment of land
among landowners is exogenously given and then passed on to their children, and so is the ability of capitalists
to generate physical capital, while such ability, unlike the physical capital itself, cannot be grabbed by others.8
The majority are N workers who are endowed with only raw labor. These three groups of factor owners
(landlord, capitalists, and workers) participate in production using land, physical capital, and human capital
respectively.
3.2 The Political Structure
The division of products among the factor owners is determined by the political system, where the ruling
group may exploit ruled agents through taxes and conscation. The establishment and transition of political
regimes are based on two assumptions. The rst assumption, might-is-right, means that the ruler group is
composed of agents who have dominant coercive capability than the ruled agents.9 The coercive ability vGt
of NG individuals each with income Iti and coordination ability et is
vGt =  (NG; et)
NGX
i=1
Iti;
where  (NG; et) denotes the groups organizing e¢ ciency with  1 < 0 and  2 > 0. The reason for  1 < 0 is
because a groups coordination e¢ ciency decreases in the number of individuals involved in collective actions
due to free-riding and information problems. For simplicity, we assume et = ht for workers and et = E > 1
for landlords and capitalists, where  (1; E) = 1 for normalization. Consistent with the historical evidence
that workers as raw labors typically have lower collective coercive ability than landlords and capitalists,10
8The factories and machines may be conscated by others, but the most important assets of capitalists in capital accumu-
lation, such as their entrepreneurial skills, technical know-how and business networks, are di¢ cult to be captured by force.
These special talents of capitalists are not readily accessible to everyone in the population either. Even in current times, how to
become a successful entrepreneur is still elusive to most people. The standard human capital such as the skills to read, write,
and calculate, in comparison, can be systematically acquired through education.
9This is in line with Norths (1981, p. 21-22) theory of state where the key to understanding the state involves the potential
use of violence to gain control over resources: The contract theory assumes an equal distribution of violence potential amongst
the principals. The predatory theory assumes an unequal distribution.
10Until modern times, the peasant is an object of history,over which historical changes pass but which contributes nothing
to the impetus of these changes. (Moore 1966, p. 453)
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the following condition about the workersorganization e¢ ciency
 (N; 1) <
1  

 E
1 +  E
(A1)
is assumed, where  E   (NK +NL  1; E). Under this assumption, workers lack enough coercive might to
gain political rights before human capital investment starts.
When two groups ght, the one with higher coercive power wins; if they have equal coercive power, each
wins with equal probability. The winner in a ght with a player of income I can capture a gross revenue I
where  2 (0; 1), while the rest (1   )I is either hidden or destroyed by the defeated player; the winners
net benet is I where  2 (0; 1), since he has to incur (1  )I as the ghting cost. The initial political
regime is established based purely on might-is-right, where the dominant group becomes the rst ruler and
imposes tax on others. The tax collecting cost is 1    of the tax revenue. The ruler also determines the
capital investment policy, namely the allocation of the total bequest Bt between physical capital investment
mkt and pubic education expenditure m
h
t .
The dynamic economic development would constantly shift the relative economic power of groups and
eventually pose threats to the old political order. In a crucial period when the political regime would have
changed based on might-is-right, the incumbent ruler can choose to compromise or repress. When compromise
is chosen, the incumbent ruler extends political power to the challenging group so that no tax is imposed
on their incomes. When repression is chosen, the incumbent ruler may preserve its political dominance by
thwarting the growing economic power of the challenging group; this leads to the second assumption, the
incumbents advantage, since the possibility to repress increases the incumbents bargaining power above its
coercive ability. The repression, however, can be very costly since the state machinery of police and army
is needed to repress domestic unrest and fend o¤ foreign invasions. The repression cost is represented by a
stochastic parameter t > 0 with distribution F () and support [; ], since it is often a¤ected by exogenous
elements such as the geopolitical situations and history.11
Consistent with the horizon of economic decisions in the overlapping generation model, the length of an
individuals adulthood, which corresponds to one period in the model, is also used as the horizon for political
decisions. This implies the ruler would not take any preemptive repressing actions in peaceful time when
the balance of coercive power is in its favor and the ruled group has no alternative but to obey the current
11 It may also be useful to point out that repression is di¤erent from imposing taxation. Under repression, the economy is
necessarily stagnated since the ruler has to curb the otherwise rising coercive power of the challenging group, who plays the
leading role in economic growth. Taxation, however, does not block economic progress, and the economic gains from it are
shared between the ruler and the ruled agents.
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political order.12 In a crucial period when the political regime would have changed based on might-is-right,
a political game illustrated in Figure 2 is played. Faced with the potential challenge, the incumbent ruler
moves rst by choosing Compromise or Repress. The game ends if the ruler selects Repress since at the
beginning of this period it still has dominant coercive power. When Compromise is chosen, the challenging
group moves next, choosing to accept the proposed compromise or reject it. If compromise is accepted, the
political power is shared between the incumbent ruler and the challenging group; if Reject is selected, the
incumbent ruler may still choose to repress, otherwise the challenging group becomes the new ruler based on
might-is-right (i.e., revolution occurs). The exact payo¤s and subgame perfect Nash equilibria are discussed
in the next section.
Incumbent Ruler
Incumbent Ruler
Challenging Group
Compromise
Compromise
Repress
Not RepressRepress
Reject
Figure 2: The Political Game between Incumbent Ruler and Challenging Group
4 The Economic and Political Development
4.1 Land and Monarchy: [0; tk]
The initial state of the model economy corresponds to a time when agriculture is the dominant production
method, and people are not educated. The productivity is so low that no saving is available for capital
12Due to the extremely long period (often in the magnitude of hundreds of years) the model covers, it is not realistic to assume
agents can take into consideration of all the future economic and political changes when they make decisions. For example,
Moore (1966, p. 30) observed that it is unlikely that more than a very few people had any but the haziest notions as to ...
what kind of a society might lie over the horizon. Moreover, most European thrones were insecure, which keeps kings from
taking a long view (DeLong and Shleifer 1993). Allowing longer horizons and strategic options such as preemptive repression
may alter the timing but not the qualitative results of the transition process; Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b), for example,
nd similar results for the political transition problem in a more abstract setting with innite horizons.
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accumulation, and capitalists are thus not distinguishable from the worker group. Such a situation will
continue until period tk determined below in (5), which means ht = 1 and Kt = 0 in any period t 2 [0; tk].
A landlord i owns land Li 2 (L;L] where L= LN+NK 1  and
PNL
i=1 Li = L. He employs Nti workers
at market wage wt. Under might-is-right and assumption (A1), the landlord has the dominant coercive
power and thus can exploit his workers by withholding  proportion of their wages. So his total revenue
is composed of not only pure land prot ti, but also the net wage tax Ntiwt due to his dominance in
coercive capability.
Lemma 1 The optimal prot of landlord i with land Li is ti = tLi where t  (1 )At(N+NKL ), while
his total revenue is
Iti = ti + N

tiw

t = (1 +

1   )tLi; (4)
both are proportional to Li.
Since initially there is no incumbent ruler, landlords can seize each others land by coercion. By the
assumption of might-is-right, a landlord i with dominant coercive capacity can grab the land of landlord j to
get a net return Itj > 0. Let 
 be the set of all possible coalition that can be formed among landowners,
and G 2 
 a generic element of the set. The following proposition shows that monarchy emerges as the
political regime in equilibrium where the king owns the largest piece of land.
Proposition 1 Monarchy is a political equilibrium immune to coalition when land is the primary production
factor. The king is the biggest landowner who owns land LM where LM > maxG2
f (NG; E)
P
i2G Lig and
imposes a tax rate  on land revenues and wages; the land ownership is secure.
This proposition implies that, thanks to the overwhelming power of the king who protects the petty
landowners for taxes, no resources are wasted in ghting over land ownership, and the property rights of
land are more secure under monarchy than anarchy. The high inequality of land ownership under monarchy
often shortens the time for society to start capital investment. So monarchy greatly facilitates economic
development when land is the main production factor. This may explain why throughout history, individuals
given a choice between a state however exploitative it might be and anarchy, have decided for the former.
(North 1981, p. 24)
The kings total income at any period t 2 [0; tk] includes his land prot and tax revenues from other
landlords and workers, which is
ItM = tM + (
X
i 6=M
ti +N

t w

t ) = tL;
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where L  (1  )LM + 1 L. Since the king is the richest person and his income ItM increases over time,
a society starts to have positive bequests when ItM reaches the threshold income Z in period tk, which is
determined by
Itk;M = tkL = Z: (5)
It is obvious that tk arrives earlier when LM ; L, and  are larger.
4.2 Physical Capital and Oligarchy (Elite Ruling): (tk; Tk]
With surpluses available in society after tk, capitalists start to use their special skills to produce physical
capital.13 The endogenous supply of physical capital marks its fundamental di¤erence from land; it reinforces
the cooperative aspect and down plays the conicting side of the relationship among factor owners. Such a
change in economic arena will induce corresponding adjustment in the political system.
4.2.1 The Economy with Physical Capital
Capitalists produce physical capital Kt = K(mkt 1; At) where m
k
t 1 = Bt 1, that is, the total bequest in
society is all invested in physical capital accumulation; as to be shown later in Proposition 3, this is actually
the optimal investment choice. Individual landowners choose the optimal demands for capital and labor to
maximize their prots, taking as given the capital return rate rt and wage wt, which clear the capital and
labor markets in equilibrium.14 By the assumption of might-is-right, capitalists also have to pay  proportion
of their incomes to the king.
Lemma 2 The optimal land prot of landlord i in period t 2 (tk; Tk] is
ti = r

tLi; (6)
where rt = (1   )At( NL+Kt ) is the market-clearing rate of capital return. The aggregate wage of workers
and the kings total revenue are, respectively,
Nwt =

1  r

t (L+Kt); (7)
ItM = r

t (L+

1  Kt): (8)
13The assumption that capitalists do not emerge from landowners is consistent with historical evidence, though it has no
e¤ect on the qualitative results. Doepke and Zilibotti (2007), for example, show that the crucial characteristics of capitalists
such as patience and work ethics were initially cultivated in certain working families but not in the landed class.
14When the borrowing cost is positive, the capital return rate rt can be interpreted as the net rate earned by capitalists;
without loss of generality, we normalize the borrowing cost at zero.
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The ever increasing stock of physical capital induces faster growth in the total output Yt = At(L +
Kt)
1 N: The king benets from capital accumulation through increased tax revenues. The economic de-
velopment, however, would gradually build up pressure to challenge the absolute power of the king. Measured
by before-tax revenues, the aggregate income of the elites (the capitalists and landlords), rt (L LM +Kt),
grows faster than the kings rtLM , and so does their coercive power, which would eventually equal the kings
in period Tk. Tk is thus uniquely determined by  E(L  LM +KTk) = LM , or equivalently
KTk = (1 +
1
 E
)LM   L; (9)
where  E   (NK +NL   1; E) is the coordination e¤ectiveness of the elites.
4.2.2 The Political Game Between the King and Elites at Tk
At the beginning of period Tk when the king still has slightly dominant coercive power, the elites and the
king play the political game in Figure 2. If mutual compromise is reached, the political power is extended to
the elites so that no tax is imposed on land and physical capital, and they share the total wage tax Nwt
from workers. So the kings income shrinks to
c = Tk;M +
LM
L+KTk
NwTk =by (6) & (7)
(1 +

1   )Tk;M ;
where Tk;M is his land prot in (6) at period Tk, and the second term is his share of wage tax. If the
compromise is rejected and the king chooses Not Repress, the elites would gain the ruling power at the end
of period Tk based on might-is-right and impose a tax rate  on the king. The net income of the king with
Not Repress is his after-tax land prot
n = (1  )Tk;M :
The king may choose to repress by stagnating the economic and hence the coercive power of the elites. For
example, he can freeze the physical capital stock at certain level K  KTk ; without much loss of generality,
we set K = KTk . So the kings income with Repress is
r  ITk;M   Tk ;
where ITk;M is the kings total revenue in (8) at period Tk, while Tk is the repression cost in Tk.
Note the kings payo¤ is higher when compromise is reached than when it is rejected and followed by Not
Repress since c > n holds due to  > 0; both payo¤s are independent of the repression cost Tk , while r
strictly decreases in it. The comparison between n, c and r is summarized by Lemma 3 and illustrated
in Figure 3.
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Lemma 3 There exist two levels of repression costs c and n in [; ]; where c < n, such that r > c >
n for Tk < c, c  r  n for Tk 2 [c; n], and c > n > r for Tk > n.
repression compromise no repression
nq qcqq
nP
cP
rP
Figure 3: The Incumbent Rulers Incomes and Repression Cost 
For the elites, compromise is better than repression since under compromise the economic progress is not
blocked and they pay no tax, and the case of no repression is even better since they get extra tax revenues
from the Kings land. So en > 
e
c > 
e
r always holds.
Proposition 2 The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the political game between the king and elites at
period Tk is (Repress, Repress; Compromise) when Tk < c, (Compromise, Repress; Compromise) when
Tk 2 [c; n], and (Compromise, Not Repress; Reject) when Tk > n.
The proposition suggests mutually benecial compromise is reached only when the repression cost Tk is
in the middle range [c; n], while repression and economic stagnation are more likely to happen when Tk
is low; when the repression cost is very high, revolution happens and the king loses political power to the
challenging group. The paper focuses on the smooth case of Tk 2 [c; n] where the landlords and capitalists
share political power and impose no tax on themselves from period Tk onwards.15
15The coalition between capitalists and landowners seems more likely to happen than the co-option alternative where the
king divides the elites by co-opting either landowners or capitalists (Bertocchi and Spagat 2001). When Tk 2 [c; n] so that
compromise would have been reached if the political game analyzed here is played, the co-option payment must be at least as
large as their tax payment to the king, otherwise they should reject it and ally with each other; it must, however, be smaller
than the joint tax revenue paid by both groups, otherwise the king would not benet from co-option. But then the group
that is not co-opted can bribe the other by o¤ering a transfer up to their tax payment. So co-option of one group is at least
weakly dominated by the coalition between capitalists and landowners when Tk 2 [c; n], and it is strongly dominated when
Tk > n and the king is too weak to repress. In the repression case of Tk < c, the king does not need to coopt any group
since it is more cost e¤ective to repress them.
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4.3 Human Capital and Democracy: [Tk; Th]
During the initial periods under elite ruling, workers are still raw labors and their after-tax wages are too
low to have bequests. The following proposition shows that when the physical capital stock becomes large
enough, the elites would nd benecial to start investing in human capital through public education. It also
justies our earlier assumption that only physical capital was invested under monarchy.
Proposition 3 Under elite ruling human capital investment starts in period th that is determined by
(L+Kth)   (1  )(Kth)1 = 0; (10)
the optimal public education expenditure mht in any period t  th is determined by
(L+Kt)h1   (1  )htK1 = 0; (11)
where @m
h
t
@Bt
> 0. Human capital investment does not start under monarchy if the capital stock at the
transition period Tk is so small that (L+KTk) (Tk )(KTk)1 < 0 holds, where Tk  1+ E+(1 +) E .
As the human capital level ht goes up over time, workerswage wt and coordination e¤ectiveness continue
to increase, and so is their collective coercive power  (N;ht)Yt. It will eventually match that of the elites,
 (NK +NL; E)(1  )Yt; in some period Th, which is uniquely determined by
 (N;hTh) =  (NK +NL; E)(1  ): (12)
The political game between the elites and workers at period Th is the same as that between the king and
the elites. If compromise is reached, full su¤rage obtains and no tax is imposed on wages, which means each
factor earns its competitive returns and the exploitative tax disappears. With similar arguments, we get the
following results.
Proposition 4 There exist two levels of repression costs 0c and 
0
n in [; ], where 
0
c < 
0
n, such that the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the political game between elites and workers at period Th is (Repress,
Repress; Compromise) when Th < 
0
c, (Compromise, Repress; Compromise) when Th 2 [0c; 0n], and
(Compromise, Not Repress; Reject) when Th > 
0
n.
4.4 A Smooth Development Path: Summary
The development path in the model is driven mainly by the technical features of di¤erent production factors
and political conicts among factor owners in dividing the outputs, while the e¤ects of many elements (such
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as geography, culture, religion, ideologies, wars, and colonization) that give much richness to the actual
history are mainly reected by cross-sectional and intertemporal di¤erences in repression costs.
If the repression costs remain in the middle ranges at both transition times Tk and Th, a smooth economic
and political development path as illustrated in Figure 1 is to be taken, where the political regimes adjust
smoothly to the evolving factor composition of land, physical and human capital; England seems to be such
a case, where political compromises were reached in these crucial moments. This type of coevolution path
is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When the repression costs are in the middle ranges where Tk 2 [c; n] and Th 2 [0c; 0n]
such that compromises between the incumbent ruler and the challenging group are reached, the political
economy would evolve as follows. Physical capital accumulation starts at period tk while human capital
investment starts at th. Monarchy is the political equilibrium before period Tk, then its replaced by the
oligarchy of landlords and capitalists, and nally, workers also gain political rights and hence full su¤rage
is realized after period Th. The time path tk < Tk < th < Th suggests that economic development leads
to political transition, which in turn facilitates future economic development. This fast-track economic and
political development is characterized in the following table.
The Smooth Development Path
The Political Transition
Time t  Tk t 2 (Tk; Th] t > Th
Political Regime Monarchy Oligarchy Democracy
The Ruler King Landowners & Capitalists All Factor Owners
The Economic Growth
Time t  tk t 2 (tk; th] t > th
Land L L L
Physical Capital Stock 0 K(Bt 1; At) K(Bt 1  mht 1; At)
Human Capital Stock 1 1 h(mht 1; At)
Total Output At(L)1 (N +NK) At(L+Kt)1 N At(L+Kt)1 (Nht)
Output Growth Rate g g(L+Kt+1L+Kt )
1  g(L+Kt+1L+Kt )
1 (ht+1ht )

Note: tk, th, Tk and Th are determined by (5), (10), (9), and (12) respectively; Bt 1 and mht 1 are specied in
(3) and (11) respectively; At+1 = At(1 + g).
4.5 Development Paths with Repression or Revolution
The smooth development path characterized above serves as the benchmark case to be compared with various
deviations; it happens when the repression costs are just right. When the repression costs are too low
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during the political transition, the economic progress is often stagnated by political repression, which may
continue for a long time until the repression cost is dramatically increased by some random shocks such
as natural disasters or foreign invasions so that the incumbent is forced to share political power with the
challenging group in a political compromise or yield it to the latter in a revolution.16
The revolution case is relatively rare since it happens only when the repression cost is extremely high.
When it happens in the transition process from monarchy to oligarchy of elite ruling, the result does not
di¤er much from the compromise case since in both cases the political power is shared among landowners
and capitalists, while only one landowners treatment is di¤erent. When it happens under the elite ruling,
workers become the new ruler who imposes tax on land and physical capital.
In the cases of both repression and revolution, the economic development is lagging behind that of the
benchmark case, while the worst scenario is under repression where the economic and political development
is stagnated. Though di¤erent in the specic timing, the sequence of the developmental stages is the same in
all scenarios: land endowment precedes physical capital investment, which in turn precedes human capital
investment, and the correspondence between land predominance and monarchy, physical capital predomi-
nance and oligarchy, and nally human capital predominance and democracy is maintained. In other words,
the dynamic compatibility of the economic and political development illustrated in Figure 1, which is the
main insight of the paper, holds for all scenarios.
5 Historical Evidence
Roughly speaking, most OECD countries have experienced all the developmental stages and are now beyond
Th, though their paths may not be as smooth as in England. Many countries unfortunately are still stuck
at earlier developmental stages. An important reason for di¤erent paths across countries seems to be their
di¤erent repression costs in major political transition times, which may give rise to distinct political out-
comes such as political compromise, repression, and revolution; these outcomes then determine their relative
positions in economic development, where those lagging behind may have to adopt di¤erent institutions that
further shape their future repression costs.
This section gathers some historical evidence trying to convince the reader that the simple model analyzed
above is relevant and useful in organizing our thoughts on long run economic and political development.
The main focus is the history of England, France, and Germany where the full time line suggested in the
16More details on the development paths with repression and revolution are in the appendix.
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model has been realized, and political compromises were reached timely enough to avoid prolonged economic
stagnation.17 A systematic analysis of other countries is best left for future research.
5.1 England
England became a unied state since the initial conquest of the Anglo-Saxon England in 1066 by William
the Conqueror. The basis of the power of the monarchy was obviously in the economy of the crown lands,
especially in its concentrated location and productive capacity; in order to retain control over both the
territory and his human resources, William the Conqueror took care that the lands of his greatest vassals
were located in the distant corners of his newly conquered country. In the following ve hundred years, the
essential integrity of the monarchy was not compromised despite some royal concessions of minorities and
weak kings to the magnates (Roberts 2002, p. 506). The productivity of agriculture started to increase
under the stable political order, and the rise in food production enabled towns to develop steadily.
The growth of commerce in the towns during the 16th and 17th centuries had created in the English
countryside a market for agriculture products, thereby setting in motion a process leading toward commercial
and capitalist agriculture in the countryside itself. The joint force of the landowners and the upper stratum
of town dwellers was an important cause of the Civil War and the ultimate victory of the parliamentary
cause. Another important element for the success of parliament over the monarchy is the latters lack of
strong repressive apparatus such as an e¤ective bureaucracy and a strong army, possibly due to the previous
evolution of the monarchy and the reliance on the navy rather than on the army (Moore 1966, p. 32).
The Glorious Revolution in 1688 marked the fundamental political transition in England from the monar-
chy to parliamentary rule of landowners and bourgeois, while the crown still kept considerable political power
within the parliament. From then on, England was governed by oligarchies representing the e¤ective pos-
sessors of social and economic power, who constantly took care to defend the commercial interests of the
country and accepted the leadership and guidance in this of the collective wisdom of the City of London.
(Roberts 2002, p. 566) As a consequence, the commercial and industrial interests were well reected in gov-
ernmental policies, and the economic development was greatly facilitated in the eighteenth-century England
(North and Weingast 1989).
Inside the framework provided by prosperity and English political institutions, technical progress was
continuous. By 1750 the most advanced techniques were practiced and the integration of agriculture with
17As Olson (1993) pointed out, though there are a fair number of democracies, there have not been many spontaneous and
entirely autonomous transitions from autocracy to democracy.England and France are arguably the main exceptions.
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a commercial market economy had gone furthest in England. The prots were then invested in capital to
further improve productivity. An expanding overseas commerce generated further prots for investment,
and the growing nancial institutions enhanced the process. It is thus by no coincidence that the Industrial
Revolution started rst in England in the middle of the 18th century, which fundamentally transformed the
society from a primarily agrarian one to a mature industrial society in one century.
The value of human capital in production was still limited in the rst phase of the Industrial Revolution,
when workers developed skills primarily through on-the-job training, and child labor was highly valuable.
Under Elizabeth and Stuart statutes which remained unreformed between 1688 and 1815, the state retained
considerable powers to determine wages and conditions of employment; such statutes and the common law
strengthened the authority of employers and depressed wages (OBrien 1994). Not surprisingly, workers still
received very low wages, and their living standards showed no clear progress before 1820 (Lindert 1994).
Soon afterwards, however, employers found that they need more than a labor force that was available,
since the contribution of workers to superior economic performance depends on both their skills and attitudes.
The increasing importance of human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution prompted a
sequence of education reforms in England since the 1830s, designed primarily to satisfy the increasing skill
requirements (Galor and Moav 2006). Realizing that workers would only expend high levels of e¤ort in the
production process if they expected to receive a fair share in the consequent returns, employers became
receptive to sharing power with workersorganizations rather than ghting unionization. The employers
acceptance of collective bargaining in turn opened the way for political transformations. In the eyes of the
British political elite of the 1860s and 1870s the advent of cooperative industrial relations under the aegis
of business-minded union leaders transformed craft workers from uncontrollable subversive into responsible
citizens. One result was the 1867 extension of the right to vote to the better-paid of the workers.(Lazonick
1994) Full su¤rage was nally realized in Britain in 1884 for men and in 1928 including women.
The English development path seems to t best into the benchmark case of smooth development, where
a national monarchy was established early to provide a stable and peaceful environment, and political
compromises were achieved in a relatively peaceful way and timely enough to reect the evolving composition
of production factors in the economy and the corresponding change of power balance among factor owners.
The economic development was thus greatly facilitated in England, which became the rst nation to start
the industrialization and democratization process that has fundamentally transformed the world.
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5.2 France
The French kingdom was initially very decentralized. In the middle of the 15th century France gradually
evolved from a feudal country to an increasingly centralized state organized around a powerful absolute
monarchy. All the main structural variables and historical trends in French society di¤ered sharply from
those in England from the 16th through the 18th centuries. The nal political outcome, however, was quite
similar in the 19th and 20th centuries after the French Revolution.
The commerce and manufacturing in France lagged behind that in England. Under the 17th century
monarchy, the bourgeoisie was heavily dependent on royal favor, subject to royal regulation, and oriented
toward the production of arms and luxuries for a restricted clientele. The practice of selling positions in the
bureaucracy, by converting the bourgeoisie to an aristocrat, diminished the bourgeois drive toward property
and political independence. Commercial inuences as they penetrated into the French countryside, unlike
those in England, did not undermine or destroy the feudal framework. There were no important technical
innovations in agriculture, which continued to be carried on in fundamentally the same technical and social
framework as had existed during the Middle Ages. The landed proprietor was not yet a full-blown capitalist
farmer, while his earlier functions in the feudal system were taken over by royal o¢ cials; what he possessed
were essentially claims to a specic share of the economic surplus enforceable through the repressive apparatus
of the state.
The growth of the French monarchy had largely deprived the landed upper classes of political responsibil-
ity and diverted much of the bourgeois impulse to its own purposes, which made unlikely for French society
to generate a parliament of landlords with bourgeois overtones from the cities in the English fashion (Moore
1966, p. 62). The French situation was not alone in Continental Europe. The representative institutions
that had appeared in many countries in the later Middle Ages experienced a nearly universal decline in
the 16th and 17th centuries. By 1789, most of Western Europe was ruled by monarchs little hindered by
representative bodies; the main exception was in Great Britain (Roberts 2002, p. 572).
But the ancient regime, which diverted energy and resources from commerce and industry and hence
was repressive in terms of economic development, was already under severe strains and soon to be mortally
wounded by the French Revolution in 1789. Hitherto, political power had been virtually a noble monopoly.
Between 1789 and 1799, however, France was governed and reformed by overwhelmingly bourgeois assemblies,
largely elected by bourgeois voters. No subsequent regime was ever able substantially to reverse these
advances. (Doyle 1992, p. 376) The Revolution seriously weakened the whole interlocking complex of
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aristocratic privilege: monarchy, landed aristocracy, and seigneurial rights, a complex that constituted the
essence of the ancient regime. The ultimate outcome of all the forces at work was a victory for an economic
system of private property and a political system based upon equality before the law, the essential features
in Western parliamentary democracies. Though not a bourgeois revolution in the restricted sense of the
seizure of political power by a bourgeoisie that already had won the commanding heights of economic power,
historians generally agreed that the French Revolution was a triumph for the bourgeoisie (Moore 1966, p.
109).
The right to vote in France was still severely restricted under the restored Bourbons from 1815 to 1830;
the electorate included only the largest property owners. After the July Revolution of 1830, the number
of voters doubled; at this point the old aristocracy disappeared as a coherent and e¤ective political group.
Then the French industrial revolution started, a century later than Britain. Though universal su¤rage for all
adult male citizens was introduced as a result of the revolutionary upheavals of 1848, it was not functioning
normally in the Second Empire from 1852 to 1870. Industrial expansion continued during this time, which
strengthened the economic and political power of the working classes. The old regime collapsed in the defeat
of war in 1871, indicating the start of a lasting democratic constitution entailing universal male su¤rage.
The French experience is less smooth and clear-cut than that in England. Its political transition from
absolute monarchy to oligarchy was accomplished by violent upheavals and revolutions, while the subsequent
transition to democracy with full su¤rage was delivered by the military defeat of war. The states high
repressive capacity seems to be the main reason behind its di¤erence from England, which was probably due
to the necessity of a strong army to establish a central monarchy in the rst place and to survive in the
conicts with other continental European states. It seems likely that the repression and economic stagnation
might have stayed longer in France if it was left alone without competition from the advanced economy of
neighboring England. Luckily, the revolutions broke the grips of the old regime early enough for France to
catch up with the industrialization and democratization process ahead of many other nations.
5.3 Germany
Germany as a modern nation-state was unied only in 1871 when the German Empire was forged with the
Kingdom of Prussia as its largest constituent. The long time fragmentation among German states contributed
to their late industrialization compared with England and France, and as a result the democratization
process was interwoven with nation building in a complicated manner that shaped its distinct conservative
modernization path led by authoritarian governments. The stable democracy was nally realized only after
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the authoritarian states strong repression capacity was destroyed at major military defeats.18
By the middle of the 14th century, Prussia still resembled Western Europe where the peasants were
prosperous and relatively free. Toward the end of this century, however, certain changes began that later
led to enserfment of the peasants. One of the most important changes was the coming of grain exports. In
the following two centuries, the German Junkers established a labor repressive system in order to grow the
grain for exporting, and at the same time reduced the towns to dependence by short-circuiting them with
their exports. The result was a militarized fusion of royal bureaucracy and landed aristocracy in the 17th
and 18th century.19
The low repression costs were perhaps the main reason why labor repressive agrarian system was adopted
in Germany. The resistance to such a system from peasants and towns was limited and easily suppressed.
Early in the 19th century when the industrialization started to gather momentum, a strong movement of
liberal and democratic opposition began forming in the German states. It culminated in the Revolution of
1848 but was soon suppressed. A fundamental reason is that the commercial and industrial class was still
too weak and dependent to take political power, partly due to its need of an authoritarian states support
to unify the national market and compete with the advanced industrial economies.
The 1848 revolution failed also because it attempted to create democratization and national unication
simultaneously. It nonetheless helped pave the ways for the eventual achievement of its goals in a sequential
matter. It carried the rural social revolution, launched sixty years earlier in France, to its conclusion in
central and most of eastern Europe.(Roberts 2002, p.753) In 1849 the Prussia three-class franchise system
that greatly favored the wealthy class was introduced, and then carried over to the unied Germany until
1918 when the Weimar Republic was formed. The coalition of Iron and Ryeformed in the 1850s combining
authoritarianism with bourgeois elements, against the menace of peasant and proletariat(Trebilcock 1981).
This alliance between the landed class and the rising industrial class created a climate more favorable to
industrial advance. The unication of German was nally achieved in 1871 when the Prussian army destroyed
the last monarchical regime in France and created the German Empire or the Second Reich, a constitutional
monarchy with a parliament of very limited power.
The size of Germanys industrial proletariat had increased as a result of intensive industrialization since
the 1850s, and workers started to organize a socialist party and trade unions in 1869. Felt threatened by a
18 In this regard the experiences of Italy and Japan were similar.
19England, in contrast, made the agriculture commercialization without tying peasants to the land and hence facilitated the
development of town life. Much of the subsequent history of the two countries goes back to this homely di¤erence. (Moore
1966, p. 460)
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potentially revolutionary force, the state issued repressive laws against socialist organizations, while at the
same time also extended su¤rage and established a social welfare system to win over the poor masses. The
full democracy, however, was to be achieved mainly as consequences of military defeats: In 1918 at the end of
the rst World War, the Weimar Constitution came into e¤ect, which transformed the German Empire into
a democratic republic albeit a fragile one; the establishment of a stable liberal parliamentary republic had to
wait until after the World War II in West Germany, and in East Germany until the reunication of Germany
in 1990. Without the defeat, it seems quite likely that Germany would not have become a democracy for
decades, until something created a decisive shift in the balance of class forces.(Rueschemeyer et al. 1992,
p. 109)
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper establishes a simple model where the coevolution of economic and political development is driven
by the inherent technical features of di¤erent production factors and the political conicts among factor
owners in output distribution. The dynamic economic progress transforms the main production factor from
land to physical capital and then to human capital, enables their respective owners, landlords, capitalists,
and workers to gain political power in the same sequence, and consequently shifts the political regime from
monarchy to oligarchy of landowners and capitalists and then to democracy with full su¤rage. When it is
too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise would be reached at the
transition periods so that the economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, political conicts may lead to
repression of some factor owners and hence economic stagnation.
A main insight emerging from the paper is the dynamic compatibility of economic and political devel-
opment, which has two implications. First, it brings a developmental perspective into the discussions of
appropriate or growth-enhancing political institutions. For instance, the paper suggests that, when natural
resources are the main factor in production, imposing democracy may induce anarchy and stagnation. Only
when human capital becomes predominant in economy, which often happens after a society has a large enough
physical capital stock, would a political democracy be more likely to sustain itself. Secondly, it highlights the
importance of a societys capacity for smooth political transitions in facilitating economic development. Such
a capacity, which is captured in the model by the repression costs at major transitional occasions, can be
inuenced by many elements such as religions, cultures, geography, and history. For example, the willingness
and ability to make political compromise may have greatly facilitated the economic progress in the history of
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England, which had that most elusive yet decisive institutional feature that makes for economic success: the
exibility to adapt its economic and legal institutions without political violence and disruptions. (Mokyr
2005) Unfortunately, in many societies the institutions are quite rigid and di¢ cult to change from within;
their ultimate changes are often forced upon by the intense global competition that imposes outside threats
to ine¢ cient economies and hence reduces the feasibility of repressive political regimes.
The papers analytical framework may prove useful in understanding related long run development issues.
For instance, it can be readily extended to study the e¤ects of international forces such as war, colonization,
and globalization on the development process of either an individual country or at di¤erent historical times,
while taking into consideration that the changing motivation, format, and frequency of these international
activities may also reect the shifts of factor composition in production. This may generate new insight on the
relationship between democracy and war: If democratic countries are necessarily highly invested in human
capital, which is often true, it is not surprising that they seldom wage wars at each other. What is the point
of conquering a nation whose main wealth is human capital? The relevant parties could have been better
o¤ by engaging each other in peaceful international trade. The model can also be extended by endogenizing
the states repression capacity and costs. For example, the virtually perfect correlation between country
size and landlord strength is no accident, since only strong landlords had the coercive power to conquer
more lands and establish large monarchies; this may help explain the distinct development paths of small
countries. The evolution of education system, in terms of both contents and nancing methods, may also be
shaped by similar driving forces as in the model, including the evolving factor composition and the changing
power balance among factor owners.
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APPENDIX 1: Proofs
Lemma 1.
Proof. The landlords prot maximization problem is maxNti At(Li)
1 Nti   wtNti, taking the wage
rate wt as given. The FOC At(Li)1 N 1ti = wt leads to the optimal labor demand N

ti = (

wt
At)
1
1 Li.
When the labor market clears,
PNL
i=1N

ti = N + NK must hold, which yields the equilibrium wage rate
wt = At(
L
N+NK
)1 . Then Nti =
(N+NK)Li
L and the optimal prot is ti = (1  )(N+NKL )AtLi  tLi;
where t  (1  )At(N+NKL ).
The coercive ability of an individual worker is lower than that of the landlord since  (1; 1) <  (1; E) holds
by  2 > 0 and w

t < ti holds given Li >L. The total income of landlord is workers is N

tiw

t = AtLi.
The aggregate coercive ability of worker is thus vW =  (N; 1) 1 tLi; it is smaller than the landlords
coercive ability vL = tLi under assumption A1. With a dominant coercive ability, the landlord thus can
grab a proportion  of wages based on might-is-right and get a total revenue Iti in (4).
Proposition 1.
Proof. The monarchy is indeed an equilibrium since there are no protable deviations. No coalition is
able to challenge the king given LM > maxG2
f (NG; E)
P
i2G Lig, since the coercive power is proportional
to land revenue and hence to land size. The king would not grab other landlordsland since the tax rate
 yields the same amount of revenue as doing so. The landlords would accept the tax because they get no
benet from ghting either as individuals or as groups. The landlords would not ght each other because
the net benet of doing so is at most zero: By grabbing another landlord js land, one can get at most tj ,
which, however, is lower than the land tax tj to be be paid to the king. The workers would also pay
wage tax Nt w

t to the king since their collective coercive power  (N; 1)tL is dominated by the kings
(1  )tLM by assumption (A1) and condition (9) where LM =  E1+ E (L+KTk) >
 E
1+ E
L:
Lemma 2.
Proof. We solve landlord is decision problem from the last step, where his objective function is
ti = max
Nti;Kti
At(Li +Kti)
1 Nti   wtNti   rtKti:
The optimal demands for labor and physical capital are determined by
wt = At(Li +K

ti)
1 (Nti)
 1;
rt = (1  )At(Li +Kti) (Nti):
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Together with market clearing conditions we get
wt = At(
L+Kt
N
)1 ;
rt = (1  )At(
L+Kt
N
) ;
Nti = N
Li +K

ti
L+Kt
:
The optimal land prot is thus ti = (1  )At( NL+Kt )Li = LiL+Kt (1  )Yt; where Yt  At(L+Kt)1 N
is the aggregate output in the economy. The total income of capitalists is rtKt = (1   )At( NL+Kt )Kt;
while that of workers is wtN

t = Yt = At(
N
L+Kt
)(L+Kt). The total income of the king
It;M = At(
N
L+Kt
)[(1  )(LM + (L  LM )) + (1  )Kt + (L+Kt)]
 rt (L+

1  Kt);
includes the kings land prot plus tax revenues from other landlords, capitalists and workers.
Lemma 3.
Proof. Conditions c  r and r  n can be simplied to, respectively,
Tk  c  ITk;M   Tk;M ;
Tk  n  ITk;M   (1  )Tk;M ;
where ITk;M = (1 +

1  +

(1 ) E )r

Tk
LM ; and Tk;M = (1 +

1  )r

Tk
LM by (6) and (9). So we get
c =

(1  ) E
rTkLM ;
n = c + (1 +

1   )r

Tk
LM :
It is straightforward to see that c < n.
Proposition 2.
Proof. When Tk < c, the king would repress capitalists since r > c > n holds by lemma 3. When
Tk 2 (c; n], the king would choose to repress if his proposed compromise is rejected since r  n; given
the kings strategy, the elites would accept the compromise; then the king would choose to compromise in
the rst place due to c  r  n. So (Compromise, Repress; Compromise) is the SPE for Tk 2 [c; n].
When Tk > n the king would choose Not Repressafter the compromise is rejected since r < n; knowing
this the capitalists would reject the compromise proposed by the king, and the SPE is (Compromise, Not
Repress; Reject).
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Proposition 3.
Proof. The objective function of the elites in period t is
max
mht 1
Ie;t  (1  + )At(L+Kt)1 (Nht);
taking as given mht 1; ht = h(m
h
t 1; At), and Kt = K(Bt 1  mht 1; At). The FOC for mht 1 is
(L+Kt)h1   (1  )htK1 = 0 if mht 1 > 0; (13)
(L+Kt)   (1  )K1  0 if mht 1 = 0; (14)
where h1(0; ) =  and h(0; ) = 1 are substituted in (14). For interior solutions of (13) we have
@mht 1
@Bt 1
=
K1h1   (1  )htK11
 SOC > 0:
The LHS in (14) also strictly increases in the total surplus Bt 1, and it would eventually arise to zero at
certain period th, after which human capital investment starts. th is thus dened by (14) at equality.
When the capital stock at Tk; KTk in (9), is too small, human capital investment will start after the elite
ruling replaces monarchy at Tk. The kings objective function is
max
mht 1
Ie;t  At( Nht
L+Kt
)[L+ Kt)]:
The FOC is
(L+Kt)h1   (t   )htK1  0;
where t   L+KtL+Kt and Tk =
1+ E
+ E(1 +) . So human capital investment will not start under monarchy
when the above inequality holds strictly at Tk.
Proposition 4.
Proof. At the beginning of period Th; if the elites freeze the workersincome at YTh , they get
0r  (1  + )YTh   Th ;
where Th denotes the repression cost. If a compromise is reached where workers are allowed to share political
power and imposed no tax, the elites then get20
0c  (1  )YTh :
20The implicit assumption is that the total bequest in society is not reduced by the transition of political regime, which
requires workers to have positive bequest at least from period Th. When this is not true, the elites have more incentives to
repress workers and hence may delay the transition, while the main results still hold.
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If the elites do not repress, workers would get exclusive political power after period Th and impose taxes on
both landowners and capitalists. Then the elites would get their after-tax income
0n  (1  )YTh
(1  )L+ (1  )KTh
L+KTh
= (1  )(1  )YTh ;
which is smaller than 0c.
Conditions 0c  0r and 0r  0n can be simplied to, respectively,
Th  0c  (1  + )YTh   (1  )YTh = YTh ;
Th  0n  (1  + )YTh   (1  )(1  )YTh = 0c + (1  )YTh :
0n > 
0
c is due to  > 0: Similar to Lemma 3, 
0
r > 
0
c > 
0
n holds for Th 2 [; 0c), 0c  0r  0n for
Th 2 [0c; 0n], and 0c > 0n > 0r for Th 2 (0n; ].
The challenging group, workers in this case, always prefers no repression to compromise, and compromise
to repression. The fundamental features of this game are similar to that between the king and elites. The
equilibrium results follow directly from the proof of Proposition 2.
APPENDIX 2: The Development Paths with Repression or Revolution
Revolution. In the case of high repression cost Tk 2 (n; ]; the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
is revolution where the elites of landowners (except the king) and capitalists become the new ruler. The
economy is not stagnated, but less e¤ective than in the benchmark case where political compromise is reached
since extra resources are wasted in revolution and tax collecting.
Repression. In the case of low repression cost Tk 2 [; c); the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
repression and the economy is stagnated with the physical capital stock xed at KTk : Then the same political
game is played in each period t > Tk as long as repression is the equilibrium result in the last period.
This happens when the repression cost in period t is low enough that t 2 [; ct) holds, where
ct  IRt;M   Rt;M = At(
N
L+KTk
)

 E
LM
following similar arguments as in Lemma 3, with IRt;M = At(
N
L+KTk
)(1    +  +  E )LM and 
R
t;M =
At(
N
L+KTk
)(1 +)LM by (6) and (9). Note ct > c holds since At( NL+KTk )
 > ATk(
N
L+KTk
) =
rTk
1  .
Similarly, we can get the other threshold repression cost
nt  IRt;M   (1  )Rt;M = ct + Rt;M :
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If after a number of periods under repression, the repression cost falls into the middle range t 2 [ct; nt]
for the rst time in some period t, then political compromise is reached, the elite ruling of landowners and
capitalists starts, and economic progress resumes. If after some periods under repression, the repression
cost becomes so high in some period t that t 2 [nt; ] happens, then revolution occurs, the elite ruling of
landowners (except the king) and capitalists starts, and economic progress resumes.
So repression may continue for a long time unless either repression or compromise happens, usually
as a result of unexpected shocks such as natural disasters or wars. Then the society proceeds to the next
developmental stage, the elite ruling of landowners and capitalists. Similar arguments apply to the transition
period from oligarchy to democracy with full su¤rage.
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